

FOREIGN TRADE ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT
OF 1982

AUGUST 2, 1982.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. RODINO, from the Committee on the Judiciary,
submitted the following

R E P O R T

together with

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

[To accompany H.R. 5235]

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 5235) to amend the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act to exclude from the application of such Acts certain conduct involving exports, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with amendments and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.

The amendments are as follows:

Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof the following:

SHORT TITLE

SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982".

AMENDMENT TO SHERMAN ACT

Sec. 2. The Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 6 the following new section:

"Sec. 7. This Act shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce), with foreign nations unless—

"(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect—

"(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or

"(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and

"(2) such effect is the basis of the violation alleged under this Act.

If this Act applies to such conduct only because of the operation of paragraph (1)(B), then this Act shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export business in the United States.”.

AMENDMENT TO CLAYTON ACT

SEC. 3. Section 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 18) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following undesignated paragraph:

“This section shall not apply to the formation or operation of any joint venture limited to commerce, other than import commerce, with foreign nations.”.

AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT

SEC. 4 Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

“(3) This subsection shall not apply to unfair methods of competition involving commerce with foreign nations (other than import commerce) unless—

“(A) such methods of competition have a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect—

“(i) on commerce which is not commerce with foreign nations, or on import commerce with foreign nations; or

“(ii) on export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such commerce in the United States; and

“(B) such effect is the basis of the violation alleged under this subsection.

If this subsection applies to such methods of competition only because of the operation of subparagraph (A) (ii), this subsection shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export business in the United States.”.

Amend the title so as to read:

A bill to amend the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act to exclude from the application of such Acts certain conduct involving trade with foreign nations.

I. PURPOSE

H.R. 5235 is one of several bills introduced in the 97th Congress that seek to promote American exports. A number of considerations provide the basis for this legislation. First is the apparent perception among businessmen that American antitrust laws are a barrier to joint export activities that promote efficiencies in the export of American goods and services. Second, courts differ in their expression of the proper test for determining whether United States antitrust jurisdiction over international transactions exists. H.R. 5235 addresses these problems of perception and definition by clarifying the Sherman Act and the antitrust proscriptions of the Federal Trade Commission Act to make explicit their application only to conduct having a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on domestic commerce or domestic exports. The bill will also clarify Section 7 of the Clayton Act to make explicit its inapplicability to the promotion and operation of export and foreign joint ventures.

Passage of H.R. 5235 will not be a panacea for the many problems that may be afflicting American export trade. Assertions that the antitrust laws have had any significant negative impact on exports are at best speculative. Nonetheless, H.R. 5235 will achieve several objectives. First, H.R. 5235 will encourage the business community to engage in efficiency producing joint conduct in the export of American goods and services. Second, enactment of a single, objective test—the “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” test—will serve as a simple and straightforward clarification of existing American law and the Department of Justice enforcement standards. A clear

benchmark will exist for businessmen, attorneys and judges as well as our trading partners.

II. SUMMARY OF THE REPORTED BILL

H.R. 5235, as reported, contains four sections. Section 1 sets forth the short title: the "Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982." Section 2 amends the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, *et seq.*, by adding a new Section 7 that makes the Sherman Act inapplicable to conduct involving trade or commerce with foreign nations, other than import transactions, unless there is a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on domestic or import commerce, or the export opportunities of a domestic person. Section 3 amends Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, to make it inapplicable to the formation or operation of joint ventures limited to commerce with foreign nations, other than import commerce. Section 4 amends the antitrust (*i.e.*, unfair methods of competition) aspect of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), to conform to Section 5 of the FTC Act to the Sherman Act amendment contained in Section 2 of H.R. 5235.

III. BACKGROUND

A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF H.R. 5235

On March 4, 1981, Chairman Rodino and Congressman McClory introduced H.R. 2326, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1981, the forerunner of H.R. 5235. The bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and, in turn, to the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law.

The Subcommittee held three days of hearings on the international application of the United States' antitrust laws, H.R. 2326, and related bills. Testifying on March 26, 1981, were Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce; Professor Eleanor M. Fox of the New York University School of Law; Mr. A. Paul Victor of the law firm of Weil, Gotshal & Manges; Mr. David N. Goldsweig, an attorney experienced in international antitrust issues, practicing with the General Motors Corp.; and Professor James A. Rahl, Owen L. Coon, Professor of Law at Northwestern University. Testifying on April 8, 1981, were Mr. John H. Shenefield of the law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy and a former Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice; Mr. James R. Atwood of the law firm of Covington & Burling and former Deputy Assistant Secretary and Deputy Legal Adviser in the United States Department of State; and Mr. Martin F. Connor, Washington Corporate Counsel of the General Electric Co., who testified on behalf of the Business Roundtable. Finally, testifying on June 24, 1981, were Gordon O. F. Johnson, Chairman, LogEtronics, Inc.; Mr. Thomas M. Rees, a former Member of Congress and an attorney familiar with export issues; and Mr. Fred Emery, a former Director of the Federal Register.

On December 10, 1981, the Subcommittee unanimously approved an amendment to H.R. 2326 in the nature of a substitute, which was introduced as H.R. 5235, cosponsored by all twelve Members of the Sub-

committee. On May 18, 1982, by unanimous voice vote, the full Committee reported H.R. 5235 with an amendment in the nature of a substitute.

B. NEED FOR LEGISLATION

1. *Business perception that antitrust laws prohibit legitimate joint activity*

Some testimony in the hearing record suggests that the United States is doing well as an exporter and that whatever problems that might exist are not caused by our antitrust laws. *See, e.g.*, Prepared statement of Professor James A. Rahl, dated March 26, 1981 ("Rahl Statement"), at 3-4.

This view is borne out by a July 1980 report to the Congress prepared by the Office of the United States Trade Representative and the Department of Commerce. The report found that the three government policies that most discourage United States exports are taxation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and export control regulations. The Report specifically stated that while antitrust laws were of concern of businessmen. "No specific instances were shown of these laws unduly restricting exports." Professor Rahl testified that, far from hindering our export efforts, American antitrust laws have been a major factor in ridding the world of many international cartels and enhancing domestic competition, both factors in improving our overall export performance. Rahl Statement at 7-9.

There is, however, evidence that a perception exists among businessmen, especially small businessmen, that antitrust law prohibits efficiency-enhancing joint export activities. For example, Secretary Baldrige testified that antitrust assurances were necessary to encourage small- and middle-sized exporters to increase their exports. Prepared Statement of Honorable Malcolm Baldrige, dated March 26, 1981, ("Baldrige Statement"), at 5-7; Hearing Transcript of March 26, 1981, at 44-45. Professor Fox, Mr. Victor, Mr. Goldsweig and Mr. Shenefield also acknowledged a perception of the antitrust laws as a hindrance in joint export activities. Hearing Transcript of March 26, 1981, at 51, 57; Prepared Statement of Professor Eleanor M. Fox, dated March 26, 1981 ("Fox Statement"), at 2-3; Prepared Statement of Mr. A. Paul Victor, dated March 26, 1981 ("Victor Statement"), at 3-4; Prepared Statement of Mr. David N. Goldsweig, dated March 26, 1981 ("Goldsweig Statement"), at 2; Prepared Statement of Mr. John H. Shenefield, dated April 8, 1981 ("Shenefield Statement"), at 1-2. As Mr. Shenefield stated, "[i]t is an article of orthodoxy in the business community that the antitrust laws stand as an impediment to the international competitive performance of the United States. Specifically, it is believed that the antitrust laws hinder our export performance. . . ." Shenefield Statement at 1-2. And the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association mentions the "*perception* of some American businessmen that the United States antitrust laws prohibit certain exporting activities. . . ." American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, *Report to Accompany Resolutions Concerning Legislative Proposals to Promote Export Trading*, dated October 26, 1981 ("Antitrust Section Report") at 22 (emphasis in original).

2. *Uncertainty in the Verbal Formulation of the Nature and Quantum of Effects That Are Necessary To Create Jurisdiction Under the Antitrust Laws*

The hearing record suggests a second, related problem—possible ambiguity in the precise legal standard to be employed in determining whether American antitrust law is to be applied to a particular transaction. Since Judge Learned Hand's opinion in *United States v. Aluminum Co. of America*, 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945), it has been relatively clear that it is the situs of the effects as opposed to the conduct, that determines whether United States antitrust law applies.¹ There remains, however, some disparity among judicial interpretations and between those interpretations and executive enforcement policy regarding the quantum and nature of the effects required to create jurisdiction.

Alcoa itself contemplated a test based upon whether the international transaction was intended to affect domestic commerce and whether it actually did so. 148 F.2d at 443-44. Following the lead of *Alcoa* and its subsequent judicial interpretations, the Department of Justice announced its view in 1977 that the United States antitrust laws should be applicable to an international transaction "when there is a substantial and foreseeable effect on the United States commerce," and that it would be a miscarriage of Congressional intent to apply the Sherman Act to "foreign activities which have no direct or intended effect on United States consumers or export opportunities. . . ." United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, *Antitrust Guide to International Operations* 6-7 (1977).

Recently, however, in private actions under the antitrust laws, the courts have arrived at different formulations of the nature and quantum of "effects" needed. For example, in *Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.*, 383 F. Supp. 586, 587 (E.D. Pa. 1974), the court looked to whether the conduct "directly affect[s] the flow of foreign commerce into or out of this country". In *Waldbaum v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc.*, 1978-2 Trade Case (CCH) Para. 62,378, at 76,257 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), the court asked whether there were "anticompetitive effects in the United States. . . ." In *Industria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitumi, S.P.A. v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co., et al.*, 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) Para. 61,256, at 70,784 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), the court required a showing of an "impact upon United States commerce." And, in *Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc.*, 473 F. Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), the court stated that "it is probably not necessary for the effect on foreign commerce to be both substantial and direct as long as it is not *de minimus*." See also *Timberlane Lumber Co. 1. Bank of America, N.T. & S. A.*, 549 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1976); *Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.*, 595 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (3rd Cir. 1979); *National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n.*, 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1981).

The precise effect of these varying formulations is disputed. Some commentators believe there are few, if any, differences in the results. An ABA Antitrust Section analysis has concluded that, despite the variations in wording, "there is, with rare exception, no significant

¹ See *Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.* 370 U.S. 690, 704-05 (1962); *Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.* 344 U.S. 280 (1952).

inconsistency between judicial precedents and the Justice Department's view of the effects test." Antitrust Section Report at 10 (emphasis in original).

Other commentators view the matter differently. For example, the Business Roundtable believes that "[j]udicial decisions are rife with inconsistencies regarding the types of effects on the domestic economy that must be demonstrated in order to establish U.S. antitrust jurisdiction over an international transaction." Prepared Statement of Mr. Martin F. Connor, dated April 8, 1981 ("Roundtable Statement"), at 6-7; see Goldsweig Statement at 2-6. The Roundtable goes on to note that "[t]he commentators are also divided on the correct test to apply" *Id.* at 7.

The Committee need not choose between these competing views to conclude that legislative clarification is appropriate. First, as a practical matter, businessmen and antitrust practitioners often consider American antitrust law an unnecessarily complicating factor in a fluid environment in which prompt decisionmaking may be critical. As the Business Roundtable has stated, "antitrust considerations typically enter the picture long before a business transaction is explored in depth. If these considerations indicate problems, the possible transaction may die on the drawing board well before negotiations are commenced." Roundtable Statement at 6; see Baldrige Statement at 6. A single, clear standard can reduce the amount of legal research and analysis that will be necessary to make an accurate prediction to whether United States antitrust laws "indicate problems."

Second, even if different formulations have not led to divergent results, the possibility of divergence in results certainly exists. Presumably a *de minimus* standard creates a lower threshold than a "substantial effects" test. Indeed, in some cases a different result might not only be possible but compelled. Businessmen and antitrust counsel cannot safely ignore the current differences in formulation. See Goldsweig Statement at 4. H.R. 5235 will provide assurances against private plaintiff's successfully proposing different standards than those employed by the Department of Justice.

Finally, at a time when international trade plays an immense and increasingly important role in the economy, it is appropriate for Congress to formulate a standard to be applied uniformly throughout the federal judicial system. A single standard will allow consistent precedent to develop by providing more definite touchstones to guide the parties and the courts. As the Business Roundtable has concluded, "no legitimate purpose is served by perpetuating uncertainty on this fundamental question."

CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE

Over the past few years, public debate has focused on two approaches for removing uncertainty that may now exist concerning the jurisdiction of the United States antitrust laws. The first, embodied in various export trading company bills such as S. 734, H.R. 1648 and H.R. 1799 as introduced, contemplates an amendment to the Webb Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61, *et seq.*, to provide a procedure whereby persons seeking to engage in joint export activity would apply to the Department of Commerce for antitrust certification. The Department, after inter-

agency consultation with the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, would issue applicants a certificate that purports to exempt designated joint activities from the antitrust laws. During the Subcommittee hearing process, many of the witnesses criticized these "certification" proposals as excessively bureaucratic, ineffective, and even counterproductive. On July 27, 1982, the House passed H.R. 1799 with Committee amendments so that the bill does not amend the Pomerehne Act and creates a certificate procedure in the Department of Justice. See. H.R. Rep. 97-637, pt. 2.

The second approach, a straightforward clarification of the anti-trust laws, was originally embodied in H.R. 2326. H.R. 2326 contained only two substantive sections. The first provided that the Sherman Act "shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce with any foreign nation unless such conduct has a direct and substantial effect on trade or commerce within the United States or has the effect of excluding a domestic person from trade or commerce with such foreign nation." The second section provided that Section 7 of the Clayton Act "shall not apply to joint ventures limited solely to export trading, in goods or services, from the United States to a foreign nation."

As Chairman Rodino stated in introducing the bill, H.R. 2326 would allow "American firms greater freedom when dealing internationally while reinforcing the fundamental commitment of the United States to a competitive domestic marketplace. . . . [T]he uncertainty of anti-trust constraints has remained a strong concern of potential exporters; that concern is remedied by this bill." 127 Cong. Rec. H. 779 (daily ed. March 4, 1981). Mr. McClory, a co-author of this legislation, explained that H.R. 2326

squarely addresses the complaint voiced by American exporters and potential exporters that their actions are inhibited by uncertainty regarding the scope and effect of our antitrust laws, and it does so without a bureaucratic apparatus which would confer antitrust immunity at an uncertain cost in Government redtape and possible anticompetitive domestic effects. By clarifying the law, it will especially help those small- and medium-size businesses which many are convinced have the greatest potential for making a significant contribution to the volume of our export trade.

* * * * *

This legislation will send to the export business community the clear signal that it appears to need in order for it to compete with greater confidence and freedom of action in the international marketplace, and it should also help to deter unjustified private and government actions against exporters. (*Id.*)

The specific purpose of the Sherman Act modification is:

to more clearly establish when antitrust liability attaches to international business activities. The Sherman Act prohibits restraints of trade or commerce with foreign nations. [*See, e.g.,* Sections 1 & 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2, which apply to "trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations."] This bill will establish that restraints on export trade

only violate the Sherman Act if they have a direct and substantial effect on commerce within the United States or a domestic firm competing for foreign trade. (*Id.*) (Remarks of Chairman Rodino.)

The modifications to Section 7 of the Clayton Act are necessary because:

The Supreme Court has held that Section 7 of the Clayton Act applies to joint ventures when the participants form a separate corporation and purchase the new venture's stock. Section 7 prohibits acquisitions that may substantially lessen competition and attacks potentially anticompetitive market concentration in its incipiency. Businessmen must, therefore, exercise caution when forming such ventures. This bill would exempt joint ventures that are limited to export trading.

This does not mean that export-related joint ventures are free of all antitrust restrictions. They remain subject to the Sherman Act, but the stringent "incipiency" standard of section 7 would not apply. (*Id.*)

D. EVOLUTION OF H.R. 2326 TO H.R. 5235

During and after the hearings on H.R. 2326, a number of experts, after expressing strong support for its basic concepts, suggested improvements. As a result, the Subcommittee and the Committee made changes in the bill, the most important of which are discussed below.

1. *Inclusion of the Federal Trade Commission*

Several witnesses pointed out that, although H.R. 2326 would provide assurances against Sherman Act suits by the Department of Justice and private parties, it supplied no similar protection against actions brought by the Federal Trade Commission. Fox Statement at 6; Goldsweig Statement at 9-10; Shenefield Statement at 9; Roundtable Statement at 10-11. The amendment in the nature of a substitute that the Subcommittee approved in December, 1981, included a new section that made a change in Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act parallel to that made in the Sherman Act. The Subcommittee amendment alters only the antitrust coverage of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act; the consumer protection jurisdiction of Section 5(a) is left untouched.

2. *Addition of the requirement that effects "reasonably foreseeable"*

Some witnesses and commentators also suggested the need to alter H.R. 2326 to make clear that the effects upon domestic commerce or a domestic export opportunity must be foreseeable:

A significant source of business uncertainty when engaging in foreign commerce is the possibility that an unpredictable, remote or indirect impact on U.S. commerce, determined after the fact, could result in a firm being subjected to U.S. antitrust jurisdiction. The Justice Department in its *Antitrust Guide* takes the position that only "foreseeable" effects on U.S. commerce should result in U.S. antitrust jurisdiction. *Accord, United States v. Aluminum Company of America*, 148 F. 2d 416, 444 (2d. Cir. 1945) (Goldsweig Statement at

11; *see* Shenefield Statement at 10; Roundtable Statement at 12-13).

Because the ultimate purpose of this legislation is to promote certainty in assessing the applicability of American antitrust law to international business transactions and proposed transactions, the Subcommittee amendment makes explicit that the effect on domestic commerce or export opportunities must be "reasonably foreseeable." The Subcommittee chose a formulation based on *foreseeability* rather than *intent* to make the standard an objective one and to avoid—at least at the jurisdictional stage—inquiries into the actual, subjective motives of defendants. An intent test might encourage ignorance of the consequences of one's actions, which in this context, would be an undesirable result.

The objective nature of the jurisdictional test is also evident from use of the term "reasonably," which was added through an amendment of Mr. Butler. "Reasonably" connotes not only objectivity, but practicality as well. The test is whether the effects would have been evident to a reasonable person making practical business judgments, not whether actual knowledge or intent can be shown.

This provision should free businessmen and their advisors from having to worry unduly about effects that are highly unlikely, but it does not permit them effectively to turn from the reasonably foreseeable consequences of their actions.

Once the effects of a course of conduct are felt, the test remains an objective one, but a defendant confronted with evidence that his past conduct has had direct and substantial effects within this country could not argue that continued effects of this type flowing from similar future conduct were not "reasonably foreseeable."

3. Imports and Purely Foreign Transactions

Some observers raised questions about the status of import transactions under H.R. 2326 and urged the Subcommittee to make clear that the legislation had no effect on the application of antitrust laws to imports. As Mr. Atwood stated, "it is important that there be no misunderstanding that import restraints, which can be damaging to American consumers, remain covered by the law." Prepared Statement of Mr. James R. Atwood, dated April 8, 1981. ("Atwood Statement"), at 14; *see* Rahl Statement at 10; Antitrust Section Report at 31. To remove any possible doubt, the Subcommittee amendment (H.R. 5235, as introduced) modified the legislation to make clear that it applied only to "export" trade.

The desirability of another change soon became apparent. The Subcommittee's "export" commerce limitation appeared to make the amendments inapplicable to transactions that were neither import nor export, *i.e.*, transactions within, between, or among other nations. *See, e.g., Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Fur East Line, Inc.*, 404 F. 2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), *cert. denied*, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).

A transaction between two foreign firms, even if American-owned, should not, merely by virtue of the American ownership, come within the reach of our antitrust laws. Such foreign transactions should, for the purposes of this legislation, be treated in the same manner as export transactions—that is, there should be no American antitrust jurisdiction absent a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect

on domestic commerce or a domestic competitor. The Committee amendment therefore deletes references to "export" trade, and substitutes phrases such as "other than import" trade. It is thus clear that wholly foreign transactions as well as export transactions are covered by the amendment, but that import transactions are not.

With these changes, H.R. 5235 achieves an important objective of freeing American-owned firms that operate entirely abroad or in United States export trade from the possibility of dual and conflicting antitrust regulation. When their activities lack the requisite domestic effects, they can operate on the same terms, and subject to the same antitrust laws that govern their foreign-owned competitors. To be sure, if the foreign state in question has an antitrust regimen, American-owned firms must still comply. But no longer is there any possibility that, because of uncertainty growing out of American ownership, such firms will be subject to a different and perhaps stricter regimen of antitrust than their competitors of foreign ownership.

4. *Conduct Having a Foreign Impact*

The intent of the Sherman and FTC Act amendments in H.R. 5235 is to exempt from the antitrust laws *conduct* that does not have the requisite domestic effects. This test, however, does not exclude all persons injured abroad from recovering under the antitrust laws of the United States. A course of conduct in the United States—*e.g.*, price fixing not limited to the export market—would affect all purchasers of the target products or services, whether the purchaser is foreign or domestic. The *conduct* has the requisite effects within the United States, even if some purchasers take title abroad or suffer economic injury abroad. *Cf., e.g., Pfizer Inc., et al v. Government of India, et al*, 434 U.S. 308 (1978). Foreign purchasers should enjoy the protection of our antitrust laws in the domestic marketplace, just as our citizens do. Indeed, to deny them this protection could violate the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties this country has entered into with a number of foreign nations.

There are other reasons for preserving the rights of foreign persons to sue under our laws when the conduct in question has a substantial nexus to this country. As the Supreme Court pointed out in *Pfizer, supra*, 434 U.S. at 314–315, to deny foreigners a recovery could under some circumstances so limit the deterrent effect of United States antitrust law that defendants would continue to violate our laws, willingly risking the smaller amount of damages payable only to injured domestic persons.

While H.R. 5235 preserves antitrust protections in the domestic marketplace for all purchasers, regardless of nationality or the situs of the business, a different result will obtain when the conduct is solely export-oriented. Thus, a price-fixing conspiracy directed solely to exported products or services, absent a spillover effect on the domestic marketplace (see pt. E(2), *infra*), would normally not have the requisite effects on domestic or import commerce. Foreign buyers injured by such export conduct would have to seek recourse in their home courts.

If such solely export-oriented conduct affects export commerce of another person doing business in the United States, both the Sherman and FTC Act amendments preserve jurisdiction insofar as there is injury to that person. Thus, a domestic exporter is assured a remedy

under our antitrust laws for injury caused by unlawful conduct of a competing United States exporter. But a foreign firm whose non-domestic operations were injured by the very same export oriented conduct would have no remedy under our antitrust laws. This result is assured by the Committee's inclusion of the final sentence in the Sherman and FTC Act amendments. It limits recovery for conduct that has no requisite domestic effects, other than the effects on the export commerce of another person doing business in the United States, to such person.

5. *Type of Domestic Impact*

As explained more fully (see pt. E(1), *infra*), in providing that the federal courts may assert the jurisdiction of the United States antitrust laws if conduct affects the export trade or export commerce "of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States," the Committee does not intend to alter existing concepts of antitrust injury or antitrust standing. This bill only establishes the standards necessary for assertion of United States antitrust jurisdiction. The substantive antitrust issues on the merits of the plaintiffs' claim would remain unchanged.

For example, the mere fact that an exporter may be adversely affected in a financial sense by the activities of another would not necessarily mean that he has sustained an injury for which he may recover under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. See, e.g., *Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois*, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); *Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat*, 429 U.S. 477 (1977).

For similar reasons, the domestic "effect" that may serve as the predicate for antitrust jurisdiction under the bill must be of the type that the antitrust laws prohibit. See, e.g., *National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n*, 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1981). For example, a plaintiff would not be able to establish United States antitrust jurisdiction merely by proving a *beneficial* effect within the United States, such as increased profitability of some other company or increased domestic employment, when the plaintiff's damage claim is based on an extraterritorial effect on him of a different kind.

According to the International Law Section of the American Bar Association, the legislation as reported by the Subcommittee, before amendment by the Committee, could have been read as ignoring

whether conduct has an adverse effect on competition. This result not only departs from the weight of scholarly opinion, but would produce perverse results. Under such an interpretation, conduct which has an anticompetitive effect which impinges only on defendants located in foreign nations and which has a neutral or procompetitive domestic effect would be subject to the antitrust laws. (American Bar Association, Section of International Law, *Report on Purposes and Provisions of H.R. 5235*, at 9.)

The Committee did not believe that the bill reported by the Subcommittee was intended to confer jurisdiction on injured foreign persons when that injury arose from conduct with no anticompetitive effects in the domestic marketplace. Consistent with this conclusion, the full Committee added language to the Sherman and FTC Act amend-

ments to require that the "effect" providing the jurisdictional nexus must also be the basis for the injury alleged under the antitrust laws. This does not, however, mean that the impact of the illegal conduct must be experienced by the injured party within the United States. As previously set forth, it is sufficient that the conduct providing the basis of the claim has had the requisite impact on the domestic or import commerce of the United States, or, in the case of conduct lacking such an impact, on an export opportunity of a person doing business in the United States.

6. *Clayton Act Amendments*

Some comments in the record suggest that the original amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as expressed in H.R. 2526, was susceptible to misinterpretation. As originally drafted, the amendment applied to "joint ventures limited solely to export trading. . . ." The concerns raised about this language centered on, first, whether the parents of the joint ventures would be included in the exemption; second, whether incidental activities necessary to engage in joint export activities would be covered by the exemption; and finally, whether export joint ventures that themselves entered into mergers or acquisitions might not be unintentionally exempted from the proscriptions of Section 7. See Antitrust Section Report at 32-33; Roundtable Statement at 17-18; Atwood Statement at 18.

The Committee amendment, which states that Section 7 of the Clayton Act "shall not apply to the formation or operation of any joint venture . . .", is intended to address all these concerns. First, by making clear that it is the *conduct of forming and operating* the joint venture and not the joint venture itself that is protected, the amendment removes any disparity between the joint venture and its parents and makes plain that joint ventures that engage in merger activity that joint ventures that engage in merger activity are not exempted are not exempted by the amendment. Second, by making clear that the operation of the joint venture falls within the amendment, and not merely the exporting or foreign activity itself, the amendment affords protection to the incidental activities of the joint venture. In order to be exempted from Section 7 of the Clayton Act, however, the incidental activities must have a strong and direct relationship to the primary export or foreign activity.

The full Committee corrected another potential problem with the Subcommittee version of the Section 7 amendment, which was limited to joint ventures involved solely in export commerce. As reported by the full Committee, the amendment applies to commerce with foreign nations, other than import commerce. Thus, joint ventures involved solely with export commerce, or other forms of foreign commerce with no import nexus to the United States, will be outside the coverage of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. For example, a joint venture could not only export goods from the United States, but also produce or market goods in foreign nations, and still enjoy the exemption from the incipiency standard of the Clayton Act.

E. OTHER ISSUES

During the proceedings on H.R. 5235, two other significant issues were raised, which the Committee did not feel necessitated changes in the legislation.

1. *Effect of Legislation and Current Law*

A very important question is the effect of the legislation on current antitrust law. It is the intent of the sponsors of the legislation and the Committee to address only the subject matter jurisdiction of United States antitrust law in this legislation. H.R. 5235 does not affect the legal standards for determining whether conduct violates the antitrust laws, and thus the substantial antitrust issues on the merits of a claim would remain unchanged.

Moreover, the bill is intended neither to prevent nor to encourage additional judicial recognition of the special international characteristics of transactions. If a court determines that the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction are met, this bill would have no effect on the courts' ability to employ notions of comity, *see, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America*, 549 F.2d 1287 (3rd Cir. 1979), or otherwise to take account of the international character of the transaction. Similarly, the bill is not intended to restrict the application of American laws to extraterritorial conduct where the requisite effects exist or to the extraterritorial pursuit of evidence in appropriate cases. *See* Atwood Statement at 7 n. 7.

2. *International Cartels*

Probably the most important criticism of the legislative concept of H.R. 5235 came from Professor Rahl, who feared the legislation could be misinterpreted as a legislative approval for American firms to engage in the type of international cartel activity prevalent before World War II:

[P]erhaps most unfortunate of all is the risk that this provision would encourage American firms not only to form cartels among themselves but to participate in foreign and international cartels. . . . Past experience indicates that a serious risk would then arise of a secret agreement to include the United States in the market allocation to round things out. (Rahl Statement at 11.)

The Committee, after weighing this and similar arguments carefully, does not believe the legislation will result in a rejuvenation of international cartels. Any major activities of an international cartel would likely have the requisite impact on United States commerce to trigger United States subject matter jurisdiction. For example, if a domestic export cartel were so strong as to have a "spillover" effect on commerce within this country—by creating a world-wide shortage or artificially inflated world-wide price that had the effect of raising domestic prices—the cartel's conduct would fall within the reach of our antitrust laws. Such an impact would, at least over time, meet the test of a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on domestic commerce. The Committee would expect the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to continue their vigilance concerning cartel activity and to use their enforcement powers appropriately.

In addition, the Committee recognized the increased sensitivity of other nations to antitrust considerations and cartel activity. By more precisely defining the subject matter jurisdiction of U.S. antitrust law, H.R. 5235 in no way limits the ability of a foreign sovereign to

act under its own laws against an American-based export cartel having unlawful effects in its territory. Indeed, the clarified reach of our own laws could encourage our trading partners to take more effective steps to protect competition in their markets. *See Atwood Statement at 6-8.*

IV. THE PROVISIONS OF H.R. 5235

H.R. 5235, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, contains three substantive provisions that amend the Sherman Act, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the antitrust aspects of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act to clarify the limits of these provisions in reaching certain export and foreign activities.

Section 1 of H.R. 5235 states the short title. Section 2 amends the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, *et seq.*, by adding a new Section 7 to the Sherman Act. The intent of the new Section 7 is to establish that the proscriptions of the Sherman Act do not apply to export or purely foreign commerce unless the conduct has a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable anticompetitive effect on domestic or import commerce, or a domestic export opportunity.

Section 3 of H.R. 5235 amends Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, to exempt the formation and operation of joint ventures limited to export or purely foreign trade. This Section is intended only to remove the "incipiency" standard of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.

Section 4 amends the Federal Trade Commission Act to make it clear that the antitrust proscriptions of Section 5(a), 15 U.S.C. 45 (a), apply only to methods of competition that have a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on domestic or import commerce, or a domestic export opportunity. This amendment is intended to parallel the Sherman Act amendment. As noted above, this amendment does not affect the FTC's consumer protection jurisdiction.

V. INFORMATION SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO RULES

1. *Budget Statement*

Clause 2(1)(3)(B) of House Rules XI is inapplicable because this legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or increased expenditures.

2. *Cost Estimate*

The Committee concurs with the estimate provided by the Congressional Budget Office and adopts that estimate as the cost estimate of the Committee for the purpose of clause 7(a) of House Rule XIII. Pursuant to clause 2(1)(3)(C) of House Rule XI, set out is the estimate of the Director of the Congressional Budget Office:

U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, D.C., May 27, 1982.

HON. PETER W. RODINO, JR.,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to Section 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Congressional Budget Office has reviewed H.R. 5235, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982,

as ordered reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary, May 18, 1982.

The bill amends the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts in restating or limiting the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. antitrust laws. It is expected that no significant additional cost to the government will be incurred as a result of enactment of this legislation.

Sincerely,

Alice M. Rivlin, *Director.*

3. *Inflationary Impact Statement*

Pursuant to clause 2(1)(4) of House Rule XI, the Committee estimates that this bill will not have an inflationary impact on prices and costs in the operation of the national economy.

4. *Oversight Findings*

The Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of this Committee exercises oversight responsibilities with respect to the anti-trust laws. The favorable consideration of this bill was recommended by the Subcommittee. The Subcommittee will monitor developments under this legislation.

No findings or recommendations of the Committee on Government Operations were received as referred to in House Rule XI, clause 2(1)(3)(D).

VI. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3 of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is printed in italics, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

SHERMAN ACT

* * * * *

SEC. 6. Any property owned under any contract or by any combination, or pursuant to any conspiracy (and being the subject thereof) mentioned in section one of this act, and being in the course of transportation from one State to another, or to a foreign country, shall be forfeited to the United States, and may be seized and condemned by like proceedings as those provided by law for the forfeiture, seizure, and condemnation of property imported into the United States contrary to law.

SEC. 7. *This Act shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce), with foreign nations unless—*

(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect—

(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or

(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and

(2) such effect is the basis of the violation alleged under this Act.
 If this Act applies to such conduct only because of the operation of paragraph (1)(B), then this Act shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export business in the United States.

* * * * *

SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT

SEC. 7. That no person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.

No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one or more persons engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.

This section shall not apply to persons purchasing such stock solely for investment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition. Nor shall anything contained in this section prevent a corporation engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce from causing the formation of subsidiary corporations for the actual carrying on of their immediate lawful business, or the natural and legitimate branches or extensions thereof, or from owning and holding all or a part of the stock of such subsidiary corporations, when the effect of such formation is not to substantially lessen competition.

Nor shall anything herein contained be construed to prohibit any common carrier subject to the laws to regulate commerce from aiding in the construction of branches or short lines so located as to become feeders to the main line of the company so aiding in such construction or from acquiring or owning all or any part of the stock of such branch lines, nor to prevent any such common carrier from acquiring and owning all or any part of the stock of a branch or short line constructed by an independent company where there is no substantial competition between the company owning the branch line so constructed and the company owning the main line acquiring the property or an interest therein, nor to prevent such common carrier from extending any of its lines through the medium of the acquisition of stock or otherwise of any other common carrier where there is no substantial competition between the company extending its lines and the company whose stock, property, or an interest therein is so acquired.

Nothing contained in this section shall be held to affect or impair any right heretofore legally acquired: *Provided*, That nothing in this section shall be held or construed to authorize or make lawful anything heretofore prohibited or made illegal by the antitrust laws, nor to exempt any person from the penal provisions thereof or the civil remedies therein provided.

Nothing contained in this section shall apply to transaction duly consummated pursuant to authority given by the Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal Communications Commission, Federal Power Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission in the exercise of its jurisdiction under section 10 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the United States Maritime Commission, or the Secretary of Agriculture under any statutory provision vesting such power in such Commission, Secretary, or Board.

This section shall not apply to the formation or operation of any joint venture limited to commerce, other than import commerce, with foreign nations.

SECTION 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT

SEC. 5. (a) (1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.

(2) The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations, except banks, savings and loan institutions described in section 18(f) (3), common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce, air carriers and foreign air carriers subject to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, and persons, partnerships, or corporations insofar as they are subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, as amended, except as provided in section 406(b) of said Act, from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.

(3) *This subsection shall not apply to unfair methods of competition involving commerce with foreign nations (other than import commerce) unless—*

(A) *such methods of competition have a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect—*

(i) *on commerce which is not commerce with foreign nations, or on import commerce with foreign nations; or*

(ii) *on export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such commerce in the United States; and*

(B) *such effect is the basis of the violation alleged under this subsection.*

If this subsection applies to such methods of competition only because of the operation of subparagraph (A) (ii), this subsection shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export business in the United States.

* * * * *

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN RODINO

I intend to offer H.R. 5235 under suspension of the House Rules with one minor clarification in Sections 2 and 4, which amend the Sherman and FTC Acts. The reported version requires that the effect upon domestic commerce or a domestic export opportunity be "the basis of the violation alleged. . ." As explained more fully in the Committee's Report, the Committee added this language to make it absolutely clear that the basis of American antitrust jurisdiction has to be a domestic *anticompetitive* effect.

I believe that it is possible to improve the language of the Committee's version by substituting the phrase "such effect gives rise to a claim" under the provisions of the Sherman or FTC Act. The substituted language accomplishes the same result as the Committee version and is better, in my view, because the Committee language may suggest that an effect, rather than conduct, is the basis for a violation.

PETER W. RODINO.

(18)

