

enemies and to the destruction of our society. They have engaged in continuing communication with our enemies, and they have sought in every possible way to undermine the morale of our soldiers and the morale of the home front. Such elements play an altogether disproportionate role in the leadership of the forthcoming march on Washington.

Others who urge an immediate American withdrawal are at least frank enough to admit that such a withdrawal means accepting defeat. They even talk about trying to find havens for anti-Communist Vietnamese whose lives would be endangered by a Communist takeover. What they do not realize is that if it ever came to the calamity of a Communist victory in South Vietnam, the number of refugees would have to be measured not in the hundreds of thousands but in the millions.

Still others try to deceive themselves and deceive the American people by pretending that an immediate withdrawal would not necessarily be interpreted as an American defeat.

But let no one imagine that we can surrender "on the cheap" or that the Communists will oblige with some face-saving arrangement.

On the contrary, they will seek to humiliate us to the utmost, to defeat us "stinking," as a top European expert recently put it.

If we now surrender in Vietnam, American honor will be nonexistent.

Our credibility will be zero, with friends and foes alike.

The system of alliances we have so painfully constructed in Europe and Asia will crumble.

Our country will be a thousand times more divided and polarized than it is today.

On every front the Communists will be encouraged to go over to the offensive.

It is my earnest hope that Congress will give the President of the United States the support to which he is entitled in seeking peace with freedom and honor in Vietnam.

It is my hope that those Congressmen who have, out of understandable frustration, called for our immediate withdrawal from Vietnam will reconsider their position in the light of the President's appeal.

The situation is far from hopeless. There are solid reasons for optimism.

According to reports from a wide variety of sources, the Vietcong insurrection is going downhill, and the fighting in Vietnam has been waning because the Vietcong are suffering from loss of morale and a sharp reduction in popular support.

Only this morning, the press reported that Vietcong defections in the month of October hit the all-time record level of 5,615, bringing the total for the year thus far to more than 40,000.

The article quoted Maj. Rudolf Fromm, psychological operations officer in Binh Duong Province, as stating that Vietcong local force units are now more frequently defecting in small but complete units. He was quoted as saying:

For the first time since I have been here we have been finding in our interrogations

that the feeling among these people is that they are not going to win the war.

There is very reason, therefore, why we should persevere and why the American people should heed the President's closing appeal. This is what he said:

Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us understand—North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that.

VIETNAM POLICY—WHAT ROBERT KENNEDY SAID

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, at the heart of President Nixon's determination to reduce U.S. participation in the Vietnam war gradually rather than precipitately is his conviction that precipitate withdrawal would sabotage the long-term cause of peace.

Mr. President, few public figures have so persuasively argued the case for reducing the level of U.S. participation that existed under the previous administration as did the late Senator Robert F. Kennedy. But he, too, recognized that this would have to be done in a way that did not betray our essential trust. As he put it in a book "To Seek a Newer World" published only a few months before his assassination:

Withdrawal is now impossible. The overwhelming fact of American intervention has created its own reality. All the years of war have profoundly affected our friends and our adversaries alike, in ways we cannot measure and perhaps cannot know. Moreover, tens of thousands of individual Vietnamese have staked their lives and fortunes on our presence and protection: civil guards, teachers, and doctors in the villages; mountain tribesmen in the high country; many who work for the present benefit of their people, who have not acceded to the Viet Cong even though they may not support the Saigon government. Many have once already fled the dictatorship of the North. These people, their old ways and strengths submerged by the American presence, cannot suddenly be abandoned to the forcible conquest of a minority.

Beyond this is the more general question of the American commitment, and the effect of withdrawal on our position around the world. Without doubt, the so-called "domino theory" is a vast oversimplification of international politics. In Asia itself, China is the biggest of all possible dominoes; yet its fall to the Communists in 1950 did not cause Communist takeovers in its neighbors (though it participated in the Korean war and aided the cause of the Viet Minh rebellion already underway). Burma, which refused military and economic assistance from the United States, repressed two Communist insurgencies without interference or disturbance by the Chinese. The Cuban domino did not lead, for all Castro's efforts, to Communist takeovers elsewhere in Latin America. Nor did the collapse of Communism in Indonesia in 1965 seem to weaken the Communist regime in North Vietnam. Moreover, North Vietnam and the Viet Cong draw their strength, not from the Communist theory but from their own dynamic of nationalist revolution, and from the unique weakness of the Saigon government. Vietnam's neighbors do not share this combination of government weakness and revolutionary strength; if they did, surely we could expect that they would long ago have erupted in insurgency, while the United States is so heavily engaged in Vietnam.

If the domino theory is an unsatisfactory

metaphor, still it contains a grain of truth. World politics is composed of power and interest; it is also spirit and momentum. A great power does not cease to be that because it suffers a defeat peripheral to its central interests. The Soviet Union is still a great power notwithstanding the collapse of its Cuban adventure in 1962. But in some degree, the aftermath of Cuba was a perceptible lessening of Soviet prestige and ability to influence events in many parts of the world. I saw this to be especially true in Latin America when I visited there two years later. So I believe, would defeat or precipitous withdrawal in Vietnam damage our position in the world. We would not suddenly collapse; Communist fleets would not appear in the harbors of Honolulu and San Francisco Bay. But there would be serious effects, especially in Southeast Asia itself. There, as Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia said in 1965, the result of intervention (which he opposed) and retreat would be that "all the other Asian nations, one after another (beginning with the allies of the United States), will come to know, if not domination, at least a very strong Communist influence." Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, an independent leader often at odds with the United States, has stated similar views.

Beyond Asia, in other nations that have ordered their security in relation to American commitments, a sudden unilateral withdrawal would raise doubts about the reliability of the United States. Our investment in Vietnam, not only in lives and resources, but also in the public pledges of presidents and leaders, is immense. It may be, as some say, that the investment is grossly disproportionate to the area's strategic value, or to any ends it may conceivably accomplish. But it has been made. Simply to surrender it, to cancel the pledges and write off the lives, must raise serious questions about what other investments, pledges, and interests might be similarly written off in the face of danger or inconvenience. Of course, other nations will not cease to defend themselves, or surrender themselves to our adversaries, simply because they do not regard us a reliable protector. But the relationships that they might develop with other countries might not be completely to our liking.

We cannot discount the likely effects on the morale of other nations, especially those now narrowly balanced between stable progress and revolutionary upheaval. Forces antagonistic to us within those countries would be strengthened—such as the Indian Communist Party—and these nations' ties to us weakened or strained.

EXPORT EXPANSION AND REGULATION ACT OF 1969

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on H.R. 4293.

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives announcing its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate to the bill, H.R. 4293, to provide for continuation of authority for regulation of exports, and requesting a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE), I move that the Senate insist upon its amendment and agree to the request of the House for a conference, and that the Chair be authorized to appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. MUSKIE, Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey, Mr. MONDALE, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. TOWER, Mr. BENNETT, and Mr. BROOKE, conferees on the part of the Senate.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S ADDRESS ON VIETNAM

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, there was little that was new in the President's speech on last evening. But in my judgment he took the only reasoned and logical position under the circumstances.

It is clear that the obstacle to ending the war is North Vietnam. For us to precipitously withdraw could bring about the massacre of thousands of South Vietnamese. It would cause our friends to

lose confidence in us and, as the President stated, we would lose confidence in ourselves.

In view of the unwillingness of Hanoi to negotiate, the President clearly stated that he has adopted a plan for complete withdrawal of all United States ground combat forces "on an orderly scheduled timetable" conditioned on the growing ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves and on the reduced level of enemy activities. This will take time. It cannot be done overnight.

The President can get us out of the war sooner if he has the unity and support and understanding of the American people.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that the Senate stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 3 o'clock and 56 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until Wednesday, November 5, 1969, at 12 o'clock meridian.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Tuesday, November 4, 1969

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Reverend John C. McCollister, Bethlehem Lutheran Church, Lansing, Mich., offered the following prayer:

Almighty God, our Heavenly Father, sometimes we are overwhelmed with the responsibilities with which we have been entrusted. Yet we are mindful that Thou hast promised Thy help to those who call upon Thee.

If our visions grow dim, guide us by Thy hand.

If we feel alone when our work is not welcomed by others, strengthen us with Thy presence.

We do not ask to escape our responsibilities; we ask only for help in doing Thy will.

God bless this Congress in all of its deliberations. God bless our President in his decisions. God bless our great Nation as together we strive for peace on earth, good will toward men.

Grant this through Jesus Christ, Thy Son, our Lord. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Arrington, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate disagrees to the amendments of the House to the bill (S. 2917) entitled "An act to improve the health and safety conditions of persons working in the coal mining industry of the United States," agrees to the conference asked by the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and appoints Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey, Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. PELL, Mr. NELSON, Mr. MONDALE, Mr. EAGLETON, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. JAVITS, Mr. PROUTY, Mr. SCHWEIKER, Mr. SAXBY, and Mr. SMITH of Illinois to be the conferees on the part of the Senate.

DR. JOHN C. MCCOLLISTER

(Mr. CHAMBERLAIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Speaker, through the courtesy of our Chaplain, Dr. Edward Latch, it was a pleasure for me to invite Dr. John C. McCollister, pastor of Bethlehem Lutheran Church of Lansing, Mich., to offer the invocation today.

Dr. McCollister is a graduate of Capital University and Evangelical Lutheran Theological Seminary of Columbus, Ohio, and received his doctorate from Michigan State University this past summer. He served as pastor of the Zion Lutheran Church of Freeland, Mich., before coming to Bethlehem Church of Lansing.

It is interesting to note that in addition to his ministry at the church, Dr. McCollister also serves as a juvenile probation officer for Ingham County, Mich.

It is an honor to welcome Dr. and Mrs. McCollister to our Nation's Capital and, particularly, to the House of Representatives.

PERMISSION TO FILE CONFERENCE REPORT ON S. 2546

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the managers on the part of the House have until midnight tonight to file a conference report, on the bill, S. 2546, the military procurement authorization bill.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENT FOR A JUST AND HONORABLE PEACE IN VIETNAM

(Mr. WRIGHT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, upon the

convening of the House today, a bipartisan group of 100 Members, including 50 Democrats and 50 Republicans, introduced a resolution expressing our essential support of the President in his efforts to negotiate a just and honorable peace in Vietnam.

The 100 initial cosponsors jointly represent perhaps 45 million Americans. They come from every section of the country. We believe that the resolution firmly expresses the feelings of the preponderant majority of the American people.

This resolution says to the world that this Nation is not about to tear itself apart upon the shoals of international dissension, but is fundamentally united in support of the basic principles of peace and self-determination enunciated by Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon.

This resolution, if it is adopted by the House in an overwhelming vote, will illustrate quietly but clearly and effectively to North Vietnam that its leaders may not simply hold out, refuse to negotiate, and intransigently prolong the war in the expectation of our imminent internal collapse.

The thrust of the resolution, however, is clearly toward peace. It makes no threats. It rattles no sabres. It pledges us, as President Nixon has done, to abide by the result of free elections. It calls on Hanoi to make the same pledge.

I include the text of this resolution at this point in the RECORD:

H. RES. 613

Resolved, That the House of Representatives affirms its support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam, expresses the earnest hope of the people of the United States for such a peace, calls attention to the numerous peaceful overtures which the United States has made in good faith toward the Government of North Vietnam, approves and supports the principles enunciated by the President that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own government by means of free elections open to all South Vietnamese and supervised by an impartial inter-